How Hamas Built a Billion-Dollar Gate in Gaza
Not only cash-stuffed suitcases: Shomrim traces, year by year, how the Salah al-Din Gate between Egypt and Gaza became the primary route that enabled Hamas to strengthen its military capabilities in the lead-up to the October 7 massacre. Over a five-year period, vast quantities of fuel, construction materials, and other goods flowed freely into Gaza, allowing Hamas to build its tunnel network and stockpile missiles. This also filled the group's coffers with around $1 billion through taxes imposed at the border.
All of this happened openly, in plain sight and under the watchful eye of the State of Israel
Miki Levy
Design: Noam Tamari | Photos: Reuters | Maps: Vectorstock
The Israel Defense Forces' announcement earlier this month that Hamas' Rafah Division had finally been defeated marked the end of weeks of tensions surrounding Israeli control of the Philadelphi Route. Central to the dispute was Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's insistence that Israeli troops remain stationed along the route, even within the framework of a cease-fire and hostage-release deal with Hamas. His stance was opposed by the Israeli defense establishment and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, who argued that maintaining an IDF presence there could hinder any agreement. Various reports indicate that the IDF discovered nine tunnels running between Gaza and Egypt beneath the Philadelphi Route, but these had all been sealed on the Egyptian side before the war and were non-operational. In response to an inquiry from Shomrim, the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit stated it was unable to comment on the matter.
The question is, however, whether past or future tunnel-digging and smuggling are really the main challenge facing Israel on the Philadelphi Route. Data collated by Shomrim – which is being published here for the first time – shows that Hamas does not need to go underground to bolster its economic, civil and, of course, military standing; it does so openly and above ground, under Israel’s watchful eye, at a border crossing known as the Salah al-Din Gate. Through this gate, an ever-increasing quantity of goods, fuel, and dual-use materials were brought into the Gaza Strip, rather than through the more regulated Kerem Shalom crossing, which is located on the border between Gaza and Israel. According to various estimates, Hamas earned around $1 billion during this five-year period solely from the taxes it collected on the very goods that helped it build its strength.
How it happened, year by year, stage by stage – until the October 7 massacre in 2023
2004
Terror before the withdrawal
The Philadelphi Route runs along the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt; it starts on the Mediterranean coast and continues until it reaches the border with Israel at the Kerem Shalom crossing. Since the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai some 40 years ago, the Philadelphi Route has been used for smuggling and to carry out terror attacks. One of the worst such incidents occurred in the summer of 2004, when terrorists fired a rocket-propelled grenade at an IDF armored personnel carrier, killing all occupants.
2005
Preparations for the disengagement
Some three months before Israel withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, known as the disengagement, the IDF erected a barrier along the length of the Philadelphi Route. A report in Globes at the time claimed that the resultant buffer zone was between 60 and 100 meters wide and that the IDF was operating there “to identify and expose tunnels without being disturbed.”
After the disengagement
Interviewed by public broadcaster Kan 11, Brig.-Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser –a former head of the Research Division of IDF Military Intelligence – described what happened after the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza: “The very day that we left the Philadelphi Route, the barrier that we had erected there fell, huge quantities of weapons flooded in – via overground routes. There was no longer any need to smuggle arms through the tunnels.”
The rearmament plan
An investigation published some four years ago by the Zman Emet (Real Time) news TV show invited several security experts to demonstrate exactly how Hamas took advantage of the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza to move up a level and start manufacturing its own arms and ammunition, which in itself make smuggling through tunnels superfluous and increased Hamas military capabilities.
2007
Hamas comes to power
Some two years after the disengagement, Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip. This is a concern not only for Israel, but also has Egypt worried. Indeed, a paper published by the Institute for National Security Studies claimed that Hamas’ ascent to power created “new threats … to Egyptian national security,” including a network of smuggling tunnels and concerns that the Sinai could turn into a base for Hamas terrorists and Salafi jihadist organizations.
2012
The alliance with ISIS
In the years after Hamas seized control of Gaza, there was much movement of jihadi elements identified with ISIS between the Egyptian Sinai and the Strip – in both directions. This phenomenon reached its height during the brief rule of Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: a terrorist attack launched from the Gaza Strip killed 12 Egyptian soldiers. According to the INSS paper, “dozens of tunnels were either sealed or blown up following that incident.”
2015
Egyptian pushback
When Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi was elected president of Egypt, pressure on Hamas was intensified: Cairo launched aggressive operations to thwart smuggling, including blowing up and sealing tunnels. Eventually, a buffer zone was created between Egypt and Gaza, which entailed removing hundreds of residents and destroying entire neighborhoods on the Egyptian side of the border.
2017
Sinwar enters the picture
In late 2017, Yahya Sinwar was appointed head of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, replacing Ismail Haniyeh. On the border with Israel, Sinwar was known for organizing protests that became known as “Marches of Return.” On the Egypt border, however, his strategy was quite different.
2018
The gate opens – under the radar
In late 2018, just a few months after Egypt tried to broker a unity deal between Hamas and Fatah – and from a deep sense of frustration at Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas – an old-new border crossing was opened, under the radar, between Egypt and Gaza. The crossing was known as the Salah al-Din Gate.
A deceptive quiet
According to an article by Neri Zilber for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Salah al-Din Gate was previously used as a border crossing for humanitarian cases and, when it was reopened, it was used for goods and produce – in addition to or instead of the Rafah border crossing. In exchange, Sinwar promised to sever connections between Hamas and ISIS in Sinai, thereby giving peace to Egypt.
Money flows to Hamas
In his article, Zilber quotes a report from Al Jazeera, in which the Qatari envoy to the region says that “trade between Egypt and Gaza totals $45 million per month, out of which the Egyptian military and intelligence service takes $15 million in commissions, and Hamas takes $12 million in taxes.” It is impossible to know to the extent of Egyptian supervision. According to estimates included in an investigation by the Associated Press, the total was between $27-$30 million a month.
At the expense of Kerem Shalom
In addition to the question of supervision, figures released by the United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) show a significant increase in traffic at the Salah al-Din Gate, at the expense of the Kerem Shalom crossing. The increase in traffic at the crossing between Egypt and Gaza, at the expense of the Israel-Gaza crossing, means not only that there will be less meticulous inspection, but, most importantly, a massive increase in Hamas’ sources of income – since taxes levied at Kerem Shalom are collected by Israel and transferred to the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah.
Diesel imports to Gaza
The Kerem Shalom crossing (Israel) compared to the Salah al-Din Gate (Egypt)
Diesel fuel is usually used to power heavy vehicles, such as trucks, tractors, engineering equipment and military vehicles
Data from 2018 to 2023 • In millions of liters
Construction material imports to Gaza
The Kerem Shalom crossing (Israel) compared to the Salah al-Din Gate (Egypt)
According to UN data, around 40 percent of all the products imported into the Gaza Strip are “heavy” construction materials, such as cement and iron. These materials were used to build the infrastructure of Gaza – above and below ground – as well as military infrastructure, such as terror tunnels, missile-manufacturing facilities and weapons
Data from 2018 to 2023 • Number of trucks
Fuel imports the Gaza Strip
Kerem Shalom crossing (Israel) vs Shaar Salah al-Din (Egypt)
Fuel is the main commodity for which Hamas collects taxes estimated at tens of millions of dollars a month. With the outbreak of the war, the fuel became Hamas's oxygen pipe in the most direct way, as it was required for the electrification of the tunnels and the flow of oxygen in them
Data from 2018 to 2023 • In millions of liters
Summing up:
Israel’s role in this whole story is unclear. It is impossible to know how aware the government and the security forces were about what was happening at the Salah al-Din Gate, to what extent Israel relied on Egyptian supervision and whether the nature of bilateral relations between Jerusalem and Cairo played any role. It is important to remember that when Sinwar took over at the helm of Hamas, the organization published a revised version of its guiding principles, in which it tried to reconcile between the fundamentalist nature of the Hamas Charter and the challenges it would now be facing.
The increased traffic at the Salah al-Din Gate did not go completely “under the radar.” In June 2021, just one month after the end of the Operation Guardian of the Walls, Channel 12, Ehud Hemo revealed that goods and materials were being brought into Gaza through the gate, describing it as “totally porous.” In December 2022, less than a year before the October 7 massacre, Sapir Lipkin – a correspondent for the same television channel – reported on the establishment of a joint Egyptian-Gazan free trade zone adjacent to the Salah al-Din Gate. “Although Israel is well aware of this phenomenon,” she reported, “its ability to supervise activity there is extremely limited.” Later in the report, Lipkin added that “Hamas has an entire unit dedicated to running the business and is responsible for the tax pipeline – all in order to reap financial benefits from goods entering Gaza from Egypt.”
All of this was allowed to occur unhindered – in plain sight – during the frequent rounds of fighting between Israel and Hamas, with each ceasefire ending in government assurances that Hamas had been deterred. Now that the IDF controls the Philadelphi Route and reports indicate that the tunnels have either been sealed or do not extend into Egyptian territory, we must question whether Israel will have the foresight to address the military and political challenges posed by the Gaza-Egypt border. Furthermore, we must ask how this aligns with the goals of a war now nearing its first anniversary: the toppling of Hamas and the safe return of the hostages.
Sources (processed by Shomrim)
