For many years, Wing X in Israel’s prisons was the most secretive and inaccessible place, where individuals accused of serious national security crimes – spies, foreign agents, and those who had contact with an enemy – were incarcerated. Over the past 12 months, following the arrest of around 30 people on suspicion of spying for Iran, the Israel Prison Service has set up a new version of Wing X in Damon Prison in northern Israel: the Iranian spy wing.

The individuals being held there—most of whom have been charged but not yet convicted—are classified as security prisoners. However, because they are not Palestinian, they cannot be held in the same facilities as “regular” security prisoners. At the same time, since they have not been accused or convicted of committing acts of terrorism against Arabs, they are also ineligible for placement in the special wing of Ayalon Prison reserved for Jewish terrorists. That wing, according to Israeli media reports, is where National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir has been working to improve conditions since taking office.

“In light of all this, it was decided to hold them in a special wing, where conditions would be very harsh,” says one official who is familiar with goings-on at Damon Prison. “At first, they didn’t even have a supply of water; many of them have lost a lot of weight because of the poor quality and paucity of food. After their lawyers complained to the Prison Service, conditions improved somewhat, but they are still very strict on that wing. In general terms, they treat them harshly and with suspicion. For example, when they are taken to court for hearings, the Prison Service guards who accompany them wear balaclavas – like they do with Hamas’ Nukhba terrorists.”

Last week, two more people were charged with spying for Iran, adding to this unprecedented wave of arrests of Israeli citizens for espionage. Over the past year, more than 20 such cases have been revealed and publicized by Israeli authorities, yielding more than 35 indictments. Shomrim has analyzed these charges to compile a profile of the people charged with spying for the Islamic Republic, what motivates them and how much money they were paid to betray their country.

“In light of all this, it was decided to hold them in a special wing, where conditions would be very harsh,” says one official who is familiar with goings-on at Damon Prison.

A special Shin Bet unit and a youth campaign

The Prison Service is not alone in establishing a dedicated response to the phenomenon: the Shin Bet, Israel’s domestic security agency, also set up a special unit to identify and apprehend Israelis who spy for Iran. An analysis of the cases that have come to light does not indicate whether the unit monitors such activity from afar, only to intervene at the moment of truth – as was the case when a recently arrested individual was detained after obtaining a firearm – or whether suspects are arrested the moment there is incriminating information against them. One interesting issue that emerges from some of the cases is that a significant number of the accused were operated from Azerbaijan. It now turns out that the Shin Bet did not make do with setting up a counter-espionage unit; it also recently launched a pilot outreach scheme, in conjunction with the local authorities, to raise awareness among young Israelis about efforts by hostile elements to recruit them on social media.

Since these investigations are led by the Shin Bet, the regulations regarding documentation are very different to those which apply to the police. Moreover, suspects do not always have the right to meet with an attorney. This forces the justice system to grapple with complex issues, adding to an even more fundamental dilemma concerning the seriousness of the crimes. The state has already said that it will not seek the death penalty against these suspects, as it is entitled to do in cases of espionage, but has also instructed the State Prosecution not to offer them plea bargains. At the same time, the specific articles of law – in other words, the crimes with which the suspects have been charged – do not differentiate between a high-level spy who caused actual harm to national security and someone who took a photograph of a local building out of greed or, in the case that will be examined below, someone who claimed that they merely directed nonviolent scenes for their Iranian handler.

“If you think about Nahum Manbar or [Mordechai] Vanunu or other spies who have been caught in Israel, then you think about all those new immigrants, or veteran Israelis, who are up to their necks in debt so they agreed to some request they got on Telegram to take photos of all kinds of civilian buildings. They are all being charged with the same crime of espionage, contact with a foreign agent and assisting the enemy at a time of war,” one senior law-enforcement official who is involved in these cases tells Shomrim. “The cases we have seen over the past year are very different from previous espionage cases.”

Back to the so-called “Iranian Wing” at Damon Prison and the dozens of inmates held there: most of them, according to officials familiar with the wing, are immigrants from former Soviet republics who are more fluent in Russian than in Hebrew. The wing houses individuals who were previously strangers but appear to share much in common. Azis Nisanov from Haifa, for example, shares a cell with Rafael Guliyev from Lod. Both were born in Azerbaijan and later immigrated to Israel. While in prison, according to one official, they discovered they had been working for the same Iranian-Azerbaijani handler, who went by the name Elshan—and who, at times, confused the two, mistakenly calling each one by the other’s name.

Nisanov’s arrest in November last year was, according to various sources, a significant turning point in the exposure of Iranian spies. As a result of the investigation into Nisanov and his subsequent arrest, eight similar cases of Israelis being recruited by Iran via social media were uncovered. This system of recruitment is nothing new: some three years ago, four women – veteran immigrants from Iran – and one man were arrested on suspicion of working for Tehran. Legal proceedings against them only recently ended and just one of the women was convicted of contact with a foreign agent. Another significant arrest was that of Moti Maman, a 72-year-old Ashkelon man, who travelled to Iran twice to meet with representatives of that country’s intelligence services and agreed to work for the Islamic Republic in exchange for money. He was convicted of contact with a foreign agent and entering an enemy state without authorization and in April he was sentenced to 10 years behind bars.

According to the officials, the detainees at Damon Prison have totally different profiles from the abovementioned spies. Most of them grew up in immigrant homes and experienced severe financial difficulties, but there are some who fit a different profile and who were tempted by offers of easy money over the internet. One suspected Iranian spy with a very different profile from most of the others is Eden Dabas, a psychology student who was working his way through college as a therapeutic masseur, who was arrested in August last year.

Dabas, who lives in Ramat Gan, was in the third year of his studies when he was arrested. One of his brothers served in a frontline unit while another resides in a nursing hostel. Dabas had a channel on Telegram, where he offered his services as a masseur and where he received a message one day – apparently a phishing attempt sent out by a bot – offering him the “opportunity to make money.” When he responded, he was contacted by an individual who did not give a name, but who offered him money in exchange for hanging posters calling for the downfall of the government. “He understood from the outset that he could fool his handler and still get paid. For example, he would put up the posters, take photographs to show the handler and then take them down. He would still get paid,” a person close to Dabas says.

“When his handler told him to pull the head off a doll and put it in the doorway to a certain apartment, he did so – but he put it outside his father’s apartment and not the one his handler told him to. And when he was asked to torch a car, that’s when he refused. He also backed up all the conversations and told his mother about them. That’s not the behavior of a spy. The worst thing you can say is that an Israeli man identified an opportunity to work for someone from overseas and to make easy money; he had no intention of getting embroiled in a security affair,” the same person adds.

Despite the fact that Dabas was paid $12,000, which he deposited in a cryptocurrency wallet, these arguments won over the court. Although his trial is ongoing, he was released to house arrest under restrictive conditions and was even allowed to return to his studies.

Shin Bet recently launched a pilot outreach scheme, in conjunction with the local authorities, to raise awareness among young Israelis about efforts by hostile elements to recruit them on social media.

A Camera in the Car—and a Spy Ring Uncovered

As previously mentioned, the arrests that triggered a chain of events included Azis Nisanov, his son Yigal Nissan, and several other suspects—some of them minors—who were allegedly part of the network he had established. While relatives and friends of the suspects have declined direct interviews, some have spoken about the shame they feel and the alleged seriousness of the crimes. Shomrim has learned that Nisanov’s home in Haifa recently caught fire. Although the blaze was officially attributed to an electrical short, the family is convinced it was an act of arson.

Either way, the case was exposed by chance. Shortly before they were apprehended in October 2024, Nisanov and several members of his network stopped at a gas station close to Glilot Junction, just north of Tel Aviv. A police officer who happened to be there asked them to identify themselves when he became suspicious of the photography equipment in the vehicle. He took their details and let them go on their way.

Shortly after that incident, Nisanov and his son were arrested; that was followed by five more arrests: Alexander Sadykov, Vyacheslav Gushchin, Yevgeny Yoffe and two minors who cannot be named for legal reasons. According to the indictments filed against them, they had been working for the Iranians for around two years and had carried out more than 600 missions photographing and documenting things for the abovementioned Elshan in Azerbaijan. The Glilot facility and the security facilities located there were of special interest to Nisanov and his crew, who photographed it no fewer than 15 times over a three-month period, in accordance with the coordinates sent to them by Elshan. At the end of each such mission, the photographs, which were usually taken using a cell phone, were sent to the handler via Telegram.

Nisanov, 44, immigrated to Israel as a child with his parents. He is divorced and has two children and used to work at Haifa Port, transporting container vessels. He did not serve in the IDF and is not known to have any political agenda. According to the indictment against him, however, he does have a criminal record, including convictions for drug use and property crime, as well as familial and financial difficulties, debts to various banks and to loan sharks. Two years ago, a childhood friend who lives in Baku introduced him to a third party, who proposed a solution to all his problems: a loan of tens of thousands of dollars in exchange for photographs of Israel.

Officials involved in the case say that this third party claimed to own a company which dealt in international industrial buildings and that he was considering entering the Israeli market. In the indictment against Nisanov, in contrast, the state argues that from the first moment the person identified himself as Elshan, that he worked for the Iranian intelligence services and that he asked Nisanov to take photographs of the Haifa port, military bases and other things.

Nisanov claimed during his interrogation that he did not believe he was doing anything wrong, since everything that he was asked to photograph was, in any case, easily visible on Google. Either way, he was paid as promised: “He was paid $500 for the first photograph of Haifa port, which is a generous sum,” says one source involved in the case.

“He didn’t ask any questions and did not ask for explanations, like why he was being asked to encode their conversations or why the money was paid to a digital wallet,” the source added. “He had found a solution to his financial woes.”

According to the indictment, over the course of the next two years, Nisanov also took photographs of Iran Dome battery locations, recorded the movement of ships at Haifa, Ashdod and Eilat ports, photographed the Kirya, the Defense Ministry headquarters in Tel Aviv, the Glilot facilities and other places.

The indictment also claims that Nisanov’s handler also instructed him to surveille a prominent figure from the energy sector – someone who often comments on the natural gas industry, especially in the context of Azerbaijan and the Caucasus. Nisanov got hold of the personal details of several of this person’s relatives, his calendar and other details. It is not known whether the Shin Bet warned this person.

The morning after the first Iranian missile barrage of the war, in October 2024, Nisanov was told to visit Haifa port and the Nevatim army base to see if they had sustained any damage. Even then, when the purpose of his mission was evident, Nisanov did not question his handler; he continued to do exactly what he was asked. The missions he was assigned became increasingly complex until, one time, he was asked to find “criminals” who could carry out assassinations – and he refused.

For all of these missions, according to the indictment, Nisanov and the people he recruited to help him were paid a total of $300,000.

A source in the defense establishment says that, even if the missions assigned to these individuals – hanging posters, taking photographs or starting fires – may appear harmless, they are very serious offenses.

The couple asked to spy on a top NSO executive

At more or less the same time as Nisanov was active, two other Israelis were also working for Iranian intelligence: 39-year-old Rafael Guliyev and his 29-year-old wife, Lala, from Lod. Rafael and Lala met in Azerbaijan and she moved to Israel to be with him five years ago; she worked as a domestic cleaner. Last year, according to the indictment, Guliyev was contacted by a friend in Azerbaijan, who put him in contact with Elshan, who again claimed he wanted to explore business opportunities in Israel. Elshan asked the couple for photographs of Tel Aviv and Haifa ports, claiming that he wanted to open a business there.

In addition to Elshan, the couple was also contacted by someone who identified himself as Hassan. Guliyev became suspicious when he heard Hassan’s Iranian accent during their phone conversations. He became even more suspicious when Hassan asked the couple to surveille a woman whose name they were given. They quickly discovered that the woman was a senior executive at Israeli spyware company NSO – and refused.

Like Nisanov, the Guliyevs communicated with their handler via the Telegram messaging app and they were also paid in cryptocurrency. Under interrogation, Guliyev admitted that his handler had asked him whether he had the courage to kill someone – and he said he did not. The indictment claims that he was paid around $650 per photograph.

According to another indictment, at the very same time, Edward Yusufov, a 65-year-old resident of Netivot, was travelling across southern Israel, taking photographs of IDF bases at the request of his Iranian handler. He also immigrated to Israel from Azerbaijan in 2000, joining the rest of his family, who came here 30 years ago. His children even serve in the IDF. Last year, he also got a proposal from a friend in Azerbaijan, who wanted to introduce him to someone who was looking to open a business in Israel and was thinking about importing tires or tourism.

Yusufov was allegedly recruited to travel across Israel, taking photographs of various places, in exchange for money. At some stage, his Azerbaijani handler asked him to install a game on his phone, which allows users to communicate. Yusufov received in-game messages with instructions on what sites to photograph. “They downloaded the games after they were told that it would make communication easier,” says one official who is involved in the case. “That whole time, Yusufov did not do anything too terrible. In my opinion, they are making a big deal in order to make someone a scapegoat. He did not harm national security and he had no intention of doing so. He claims that the businessman he was in contact with was not even Iranian and it is not clear if there is any evidence linking him with the Iranians.”

The indictment paints a very different picture. Yusufov is accused of photographing the IDF’s training base in the Negev, Nevatim base and other military facilities. The state says that he was paid a total of $41,000. When his attorney was asked about this, he said that the photos were not of army bases and were taken while driving on roads outside these places.

Yusufov and his family will never forget the day of the arrest. Late at night, their apartment was raided by masked and armed men. Yusufov’s daughter’s boyfriend, thinking that terrorists were attacking, drew his weapon and was beaten, handcuffed and arrested. The suspect’s children and ex-wife were also arrested and questioned.

Yusufov claimed during interrogation that he acted in good faith. He said that while he suspected he was being manipulated in some way, he thought it was all about business. He even said he asked his family for help installing the relevant applications and communicating with his handler, since he found it hard to use the cell phone. 

One of the main arguments raised by defense attorneys in all these cases is that there is no evidence that the handlers were actually Iranian. “In the past, in a similar court case, the Shin Bet submitted legal opinions knowing that the handler was Iranian. In the cases that have come to light over the past year, including the suspect I represent, that has not happened,” says Maher Talhami, who is representing Nisanov. At the same time, it is important to note that most of the indictments – including the one against Nisanov – insist that the suspects knew for certain that their handlers were working for the Iranian intelligence services.

According to reports, two of the people arrested for spying for Iran also went to the moshav on which Defense Minister Israel Katz lives, after they were asked to install security cameras near his home.

It starts with photographs – and ends with consent to murder

Talhami is familiar with most of the security indictments filed over the past year. He says that most of the defendants come from weaker socio-economic groups and, because of limited financial means, rely on public defenders. “In every single case, the missions that the handlers requested are ridiculous, like spraying graffiti or putting up posters. But they get more complex,” he says. He cites the case of Vladimir Verhovsky, who was arrested for espionage in October last year. His handlers were not content with photos and graffiti; he got his hands on a gun and agreed to assassinate an Israeli scientist in exchange for 100,000 shekels. The Shin Bet thwarted the assassination.

According to reports in the Israeli media, two of the people arrested for spying for Iran also went to the moshav on which Defense Minister Israel Katz lives, after they were asked to install security cameras near his home. Another suspect was arrested after collecting information about Naftali Bennett during the former prime minister’s stay in hospital; others were also tasked with hanging anti-Netanyahu posters, supporting protests against the government and spraying “Children of Ruhollah” graffiti – all in accordance with the instructions of anonymous handlers on Telegram.

Most of the trials are not moving forward. “There were efforts to reach a plea deal in one of the cases but that got nowhere and, as far as we understand, the state is very adamant in its position. These are unprecedented cases; they are being charged with aiding the enemy during a time of war. But you have to remember that, in the past, there were genuinely severe cases that cited these crimes, while what we’re dealing with now is people who photographed cemeteries or painted graffiti,” says one senior law-enforcement official who is involved in the issue. “The prosecution has not set criteria in terms of what punishments it is seeking.”

Omer Adiri, who represents another suspected Iranian spy, adds: “There’s no comparison between someone who planned to assassinate officials and photographed security installations, and someone like my client who merely hung and removed signs. Yet, he still faces trial for an offense carrying a 15-years sentence.”

There is one question that we cannot answer at this stage: If so many Israelis have been arrested during wartime for taking photographs of military facilities and defensive positions for foreign agents, are there many others who have yet to be uncovered? What is certain, however, is that the Iranians’ ability to recruit spies have been boosted by social media – and they are taking full advantage of it.

The Israel Prison Service said in response: “The prisoners and detainees are held in accordance with the law and their rights are safeguarded. Any claim otherwise will be investigated by the relevant bodies.”

A source in the defense establishment says that, even if the missions assigned to these individuals – hanging posters, taking photographs or starting fires – may appear harmless, they are very serious offenses. Defense officials know that, in addition to filing indictment against the suspects, they have to explain to the public the significance of illicit communication with Iranians. To this end, the Shin Bet and the Federation of Local Authorities have just launched a pilot scheme, including lectures to students, educational staff and teachers, in an effort to raise awareness about contact with foreign agents who offer money for similar missions. They are especially keen to do so now, just ahead of Israeli children’s summer vacation.